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Single Idea 4474

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies ]

Full Idea

A theory of existence should 1) be consistent with what actually exists, 2) be consistent with what could exist, 3) not make existence impossible (e.g. in space-time), 4) not violate logic, 5) make knowing the theory possible.

Gist of Idea

Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating

Source

J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.6)

Book Ref

Moreland,J.P.: 'Universals' [Acumen 2001], p.135

A Reaction

A nice bit of metaphilosophical analysis. I still doubt whether a theory of existence is possible (something has to be 'given' a priori), but this is a good place to start the attempt.

The 24 ideas from J.P. Moreland

4451 If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland]
4450 The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland]
4453 One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland]
4449 Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland]
4454 The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland]
4452 Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland]
4459 Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland]
4458 Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland]
4457 There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland]
4456 Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple [Moreland]
4455 It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland]
4460 Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing [Moreland]
4461 Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland]
4462 A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland]
4463 In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland]
4464 Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland]
4467 A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland]
4469 There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland]
4468 How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland]
4471 We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland]
4474 Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating [Moreland]
4472 Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland]
4473 'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists [Moreland]
4476 Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false [Moreland]