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Full Idea
Any account of the identity of material objects which turns on the identity of places and times must face the objection that the identity of places and times depends, in turn, on the identities of the objects located at them.
Gist of Idea
Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity
Source
Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.56)
Book Ref
Loux,Michael J.: 'Metaphysics: a contemporary introduction' [Routledge 2000], p.56
A Reaction
This may be a benign circle, in which we concede that there are two basic interdependent concepts of objects and space-time. If you want to define identity - in terms of what?
| 14960 | Bodies are independent of thought, and coincide with part of space [Hobbes] |
| 17250 | If you separate the two places of one thing, you will also separate the thing [Hobbes] |
| 17249 | If you separated two things in the same place, you would also separate the places [Hobbes] |
| 12506 | A thing is individuated just by existing at a time and place [Locke] |
| 12563 | Obviously two bodies cannot be in the same place [Locke] |
| 12693 | A body is that which exists in space [Leibniz] |
| 13098 | We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz] |
| 21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
| 16496 | Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins] |
| 4480 | Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux] |
| 8292 | Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe] |
| 7961 | A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C] |