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Full Idea
Any account of the identity of material objects which turns on the identity of places and times must face the objection that the identity of places and times depends, in turn, on the identities of the objects located at them.
Gist of Idea
Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity
Source
Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.56)
Book Ref
Loux,Michael J.: 'Metaphysics: a contemporary introduction' [Routledge 2000], p.56
A Reaction
This may be a benign circle, in which we concede that there are two basic interdependent concepts of objects and space-time. If you want to define identity - in terms of what?
| 4477 | Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux] |
| 4478 | Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux] |
| 4480 | Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux] |
| 4481 | Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux] |
| 4482 | Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux] |
| 4483 | If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux] |