more on this theme     |     more from this text


Single Idea 4483

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes ]

Full Idea

If trope theorists say abstract singular terms name sets of tropes, what is the referent of 'is a unicorn'? The only candidate is the null set (with no members), but there is just one null set, so 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' will be identical.

Gist of Idea

If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical

Source

Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.86)

Book Ref

Loux,Michael J.: 'Metaphysics: a contemporary introduction' [Routledge 2000], p.86


A Reaction

Not crucial, I would think, given that a unicorn is just a horse with a horn. Hume explains how we do that, combining ideas which arose from actual tropes.


The 6 ideas from Michael J. Loux

Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux]
Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux]
Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux]
Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux]
Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux]
If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux]