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Single Idea 4561

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour ]

Full Idea

Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences.

Gist of Idea

Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences

Source

David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §2.3)

Book Ref

Cooper,David E.: 'Philosophy and the Nature of Language' [Longman 1979], p.31


A Reaction

Yet another telling objection to behaviourism. When I look at broccoli I may have a disposition to be sick, but that isn't part of the concept of broccoli.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [mind as a collection of dispositions to behave]:

You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle]
Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle]
You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach]
Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong]
Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE]
Defining dispositions is circular [Harman]
Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim]
Dispositions are second-order properties, the property of having some property [Jackson/Pargetter/Prior, by Armstrong]
Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block]
In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R]
Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil]
Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A]