more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 4594

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument ]

Full Idea

Imagine a neuroscientist who is intimately familiar with the physiology of headaches, but who has never actually experienced a headache.

Gist of Idea

A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one

Source

John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.3)

Book Ref

Heil,John: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Routledge 1998], p.55


A Reaction

A more realistic version of Frank Jackson's 'Mary'. Doctors need to know that headaches are unpleasant; what they actually feel like seems irrelevant (epiphenomenal). What's it like to only have two pairs of shoes?


The 7 ideas with the same theme [qualia knowledge goes beyond physical knowledge]:

If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson]
No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson]
Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson]
Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim]
Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau]
Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane]
A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil]