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Single Idea 4597

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind ]

Full Idea

The early identity theorists talked of identifying mental processes with brain processes, but I am now proposing it as a theory about properties.

Gist of Idea

Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties

Source

John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.3)

Book Ref

Heil,John: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Routledge 1998], p.75


A Reaction

Since a process is presumably composed of more basic ontological ingredients, this is presumably a good move, but there is still a vagueness about the whole concept of a 'property'.


The 22 ideas with the same theme [all mental events can be explained physically]:

You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius]
We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell]
Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle]
Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle]
Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim]
Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau]
Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau]
Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan]
'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H]
We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan]
Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan]
Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette]
Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil]
Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation [Carter,R]
Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex [Carter,R]
We imagine small and large objects scaled to the same size, suggesting a fixed capacity for imagination [Lavers]
Studying biology presumes the laws of chemistry, and it could never contradict them [Friend]