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Single Idea 4599
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
]
Full Idea
Although your heart is a material object, the property of being a heart is, if we accept the functionalist picture, not a material property.
Gist of Idea
Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property
Source
John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.4)
Book Ref
Heil,John: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Routledge 1998], p.97
A Reaction
Presumably functional properties are not physical because they are multiply realisable. The property of being a heart is more like a theoretical flow diagram than it is like a muscle. That word 'property' again…
The
37 ideas
from 'Philosophy of Mind'
4588
|
There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences
[Heil]
|
4586
|
You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology
[Heil]
|
4587
|
From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property
[Heil]
|
4590
|
If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem
[Heil]
|
4591
|
Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality
[Heil]
|
4592
|
If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat
[Heil]
|
4593
|
'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties
[Heil]
|
4597
|
Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties
[Heil]
|
4594
|
A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one
[Heil]
|
4595
|
No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene
[Heil]
|
4596
|
The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem
[Heil]
|
4598
|
Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them
[Heil]
|
4599
|
Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property
[Heil]
|
4601
|
Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels
[Heil]
|
4602
|
Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels
[Heil]
|
4603
|
Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws
[Heil]
|
4607
|
Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are
[Heil]
|
4605
|
Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning'
[Heil]
|
4606
|
To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble'
[Heil]
|
4604
|
If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them?
[Heil]
|
4609
|
It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs
[Heil]
|
4619
|
'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised
[Heil]
|
4620
|
Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things
[Heil]
|
4625
|
Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional?
[Heil]
|
4616
|
A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws
[Heil]
|
4614
|
Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions
[Heil]
|
4624
|
If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia
[Heil]
|
4617
|
A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone
[Heil]
|
4612
|
Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate
[Heil]
|
4615
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Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties
[Heil]
|
4611
|
The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties
[Heil]
|
4621
|
Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities
[Heil]
|
4610
|
Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought
[Heil]
|
4618
|
If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind
[Heil]
|
4623
|
Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery
[Heil]
|
4626
|
The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world
[Heil]
|
4622
|
Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements
[Heil]
|