more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
The Armstrong/Lewis version of functionalism takes mental properties to be functional properties, but identifies these with what other functionalists would regard as their realisers.
Gist of Idea
Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser
Source
report of David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968]) by John Heil - Philosophy of Mind Ch.4
Book Ref
Heil,John: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Routledge 1998], p.98
A Reaction
Heil rejects this, but I am beginning to think that this is the answer. If functions do not have an ontological life of their own (the 'ringing' of the bell), then functionalist mental states can't either. Function is not an ontological category.
| 4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
| 5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7441 | Experiences are defined by their causal role, and causal roles belong to physical states [Lewis] |
| 7442 | 'Pain' contingently names the state that occupies the causal role of pain [Lewis] |
| 7444 | Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis] |
| 3011 | Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor] |