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Single Idea 4602

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique ]

Full Idea

The categories embedded in a higher-level science (psychology, for instance) designate genuine properties of objects, which are not reducible to properties found in sciences at lower levels.

Gist of Idea

Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels

Source

John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.4)

Book Ref

Heil,John: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Routledge 1998], p.117

A Reaction

This isn't an argument against reductionism. It is obviously true that someone with a physics degree won't make a good doctor. It's these wretched 'property' things again. Is 'found repulsive by me' a property terrorists?

The 37 ideas from 'Philosophy of Mind'

4588 There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences [Heil]
4587 From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property [Heil]
4586 You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil]
4591 Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality [Heil]
4592 If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat [Heil]
4590 If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem [Heil]
4593 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil]
4597 Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil]
4596 The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil]
4594 A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil]
4595 No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil]
4599 Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil]
4601 Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels [Heil]
4602 Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels [Heil]
4603 Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil]
4598 Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil]
4609 It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil]
4605 Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning' [Heil]
4606 To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble' [Heil]
4604 If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them? [Heil]
4607 Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are [Heil]
4611 The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties [Heil]
4622 Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements [Heil]
4617 A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil]
4615 Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties [Heil]
4612 Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate [Heil]
4616 A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws [Heil]
4610 Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought [Heil]
4618 If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil]
4621 Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities [Heil]
4623 Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil]
4626 The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world [Heil]
4614 Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil]
4624 If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil]
4619 'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil]
4620 Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil]
4625 Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional? [Heil]