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Single Idea 4623

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality ]

Full Idea

Some philosophers have thought that intentional states are exhausted by propositional attitudes, but what about mental imagery? You may have propositional attitudes to food, but I would wager that most of your thoughts about it are imagistic.

Gist of Idea

Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery

Source

John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)

Book Ref

Heil,John: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Routledge 1998], p.212


A Reaction

Seems right. If I encounter an object by which I am bewildered, I may form no propositions at all about it, but I can still contemplate the object.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [what exactly is intentionality?]:

All mental phenomena contain an object [Brentano]
Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre]
Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle]
Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle]
Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle]
Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim]
Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor]
How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB]
If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar]
Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan]
If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H]
Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane]
Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane]
Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil]
Dreams and imagery show the brain can generate awareness and meaning without input [Edelman/Tononi]
Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider]