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Single Idea 4624
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
]
Full Idea
If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia.
Gist of Idea
If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia
Source
John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
Book Ref
Heil,John: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Routledge 1998], p.212
A Reaction
The problem is not that qualia must be denied, but that there is strong pressure to class them as epiphenomena. However, a raw colour can have a causal role (e.g. in an art gallery). Best to say (with Chalmers?) that functions cause qualia?
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[criticisms of the functionalist theory of mind]:
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2348
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Is there just one computational state for each specific belief?
[Putnam]
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2332
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Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic
[Putnam]
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2071
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If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology
[Putnam]
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3499
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Computation presupposes consciousness
[Searle]
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3501
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If we are computers, who is the user?
[Searle]
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3393
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How do functional states give rise to mental causation?
[Kim]
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2578
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Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain?
[Block]
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2585
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Not just any old functional network will have mental states
[Block]
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2586
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In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures?
[Block]
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3514
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Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions
[Papineau]
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7870
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Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role
[Papineau]
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3206
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One computer program could either play chess or fight a war
[Rey]
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2418
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The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside
[Chalmers]
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7062
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Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation
[Heil]
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4624
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If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia
[Heil]
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6623
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Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion
[Lowe]
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6628
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Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties
[Lowe]
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6629
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Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies'
[Lowe]
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