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Single Idea 4698

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts ]

Full Idea

What counts as a fact partly depends on human input, such as the availability of concepts to describe such facts.

Gist of Idea

What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them

Source

Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.1)

Book Ref

O'Grady,Paul: 'Relativism' [Acumen 2002], p.10


A Reaction

The point must be taken. I am happy to generalise about 'The Facts', meaning 'whatever is the case', but the individuation of specific facts is bound to hit the current problem.


The 21 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about facts]:

Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce]
As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell]
Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell]
You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell]
Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M on Wittgenstein]
A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam]
We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]
Events are picked out by descriptions, and facts by whole sentences [Crane]
Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K]
Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe]
Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe]
The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe]
It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe]
If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson]
Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen]
What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them [O'Grady]
Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia]
No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia]
There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber]
Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen]
The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]