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Single Idea 4706
[filed under theme 19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
]
Full Idea
In his earlier work, Quine defended the view that no belief (including logic) is in principle unrevisable, but in his later work (1970) he took the conservative view that we would always impute mistranslation rather than deviancy.
Gist of Idea
Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation
Source
Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.2)
Book Ref
O'Grady,Paul: 'Relativism' [Acumen 2002], p.51
A Reaction
I take it he was influenced by Davidson's 'principle of charity'. He says that if someone asserts 'p and not-p', we would assume a misunderstanding of 'and' or 'not'.
The
24 ideas
from Paul O'Grady
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4698
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What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them
[O'Grady]
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4697
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There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn'
[O'Grady]
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4701
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To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong'
[O'Grady]
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4703
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The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality'
[O'Grady]
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4705
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Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system
[O'Grady]
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4700
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A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false'
[O'Grady]
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4704
|
Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one
[O'Grady]
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4706
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Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation
[O'Grady]
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4710
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Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts'
[O'Grady]
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4711
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Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties
[O'Grady]
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4715
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We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them
[O'Grady]
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4709
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Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints
[O'Grady]
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4717
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If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable
[O'Grady]
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4720
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Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised
[O'Grady]
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4722
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Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification
[O'Grady]
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4724
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Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this
[O'Grady]
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4723
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Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation
[O'Grady]
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4725
|
Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests
[O'Grady]
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4719
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Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative
[O'Grady]
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4727
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The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas
[O'Grady]
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4734
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Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it
[O'Grady]
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4731
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Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence
[O'Grady]
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4732
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One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth
[O'Grady]
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4735
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Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality
[O'Grady]
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