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Single Idea 4715
[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
]
Full Idea
Those defending the claim that objects exist with identity conditions not imposed by us, do not have to say that there is just one account of those objects possible.
Gist of Idea
We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them
Source
Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3)
Book Ref
O'Grady,Paul: 'Relativism' [Acumen 2002], p.74
A Reaction
This seems right, but the test question is whether the mind of God contains a single unified theory/account. Are multiple accounts the result of human inadequacy? Yes, I surmise.
The
24 ideas
from 'Relativism'
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4697
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There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn'
[O'Grady]
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4698
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What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them
[O'Grady]
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4703
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The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality'
[O'Grady]
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4701
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To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong'
[O'Grady]
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4705
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Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system
[O'Grady]
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4700
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A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false'
[O'Grady]
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4704
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Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one
[O'Grady]
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4706
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Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation
[O'Grady]
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4711
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Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties
[O'Grady]
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4715
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We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them
[O'Grady]
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4709
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Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints
[O'Grady]
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4710
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Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts'
[O'Grady]
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4717
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If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable
[O'Grady]
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4725
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Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests
[O'Grady]
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4720
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Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised
[O'Grady]
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4722
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Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification
[O'Grady]
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4724
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Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this
[O'Grady]
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4723
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Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation
[O'Grady]
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4719
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Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative
[O'Grady]
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4727
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The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas
[O'Grady]
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4734
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Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it
[O'Grady]
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4732
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One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth
[O'Grady]
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4731
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Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence
[O'Grady]
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4735
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Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality
[O'Grady]
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