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Full Idea
There may be no way to avoid scepticism about meaning if you abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction in the way Quine does.
Gist of Idea
If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable
Source
Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3)
Book Ref
O'Grady,Paul: 'Relativism' [Acumen 2002], p.80
A Reaction
My suspicion was always that Quine's proposal began the slippery road to hell. It appears to be pragmatists who are most drawn to Quine's idea. The proposal that all my analytic propositions could be treated as synthetic totally baffles me.
Related Idea
Idea 8803 Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
| 19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
| 3087 | The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman] |
| 4890 | A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry] |
| 2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
| 9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |
| 4717 | If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable [O'Grady] |
| 22152 | Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter] |