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Full Idea
It is possible to conceive of one understanding the meaning of a realm of ideas, but holding that one cannot judge as to the truth or rationality of the claims made in it.
Gist of Idea
One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth
Source
Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.5)
Book Ref
O'Grady,Paul: 'Relativism' [Acumen 2002], p.158
A Reaction
I think Davidson gives good grounds for challenging this, by doubt whether one 'conceptual scheme' can know another without grasping its rationality and truth-conditions.
| 12127 | Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon] |
| 5940 | Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable [Ross] |
| 17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
| 12128 | In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn] |
| 6162 | Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn] |
| 22184 | Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory [Kuhn, by Okasha] |
| 7619 | Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them [Putnam on Kuhn] |
| 3866 | If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith] |
| 4732 | One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth [O'Grady] |
| 22185 | Two things can't be incompatible if they are incommensurable [Okasha] |