more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 4732
[filed under theme 14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
]
Full Idea
It is possible to conceive of one understanding the meaning of a realm of ideas, but holding that one cannot judge as to the truth or rationality of the claims made in it.
Gist of Idea
One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth
Source
Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.5)
Book Ref
O'Grady,Paul: 'Relativism' [Acumen 2002], p.158
A Reaction
I think Davidson gives good grounds for challenging this, by doubt whether one 'conceptual scheme' can know another without grasping its rationality and truth-conditions.
The
24 ideas
from Paul O'Grady
|
4697
|
There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn'
[O'Grady]
|
|
4698
|
What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them
[O'Grady]
|
|
4703
|
The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality'
[O'Grady]
|
|
4701
|
To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong'
[O'Grady]
|
|
4705
|
Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system
[O'Grady]
|
|
4700
|
A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false'
[O'Grady]
|
|
4704
|
Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one
[O'Grady]
|
|
4706
|
Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation
[O'Grady]
|
|
4711
|
Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties
[O'Grady]
|
|
4715
|
We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them
[O'Grady]
|
|
4709
|
Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints
[O'Grady]
|
|
4710
|
Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts'
[O'Grady]
|
|
4717
|
If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable
[O'Grady]
|
|
4725
|
Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests
[O'Grady]
|
|
4720
|
Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised
[O'Grady]
|
|
4722
|
Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification
[O'Grady]
|
|
4724
|
Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this
[O'Grady]
|
|
4723
|
Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation
[O'Grady]
|
|
4719
|
Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative
[O'Grady]
|
|
4727
|
The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas
[O'Grady]
|
|
4734
|
Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it
[O'Grady]
|
|
4732
|
One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth
[O'Grady]
|
|
4731
|
Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence
[O'Grady]
|
|
4735
|
Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality
[O'Grady]
|