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Single Idea 4744

[filed under theme 3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique ]

Full Idea

The correspondence theory implies displaying an identity or similarity of structure between the contents of thoughts and the way the world is structured, but we seem only to be able to say that the world's structure corresponds to our thoughts.

Gist of Idea

We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts

Source

Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.2)

Book Ref

Engel,Pascal: 'Truth' [Acumen 2002], p.25


A Reaction

I don't accept this. The structure of the world gives rise to our thoughts. There is an epistemological problem here (big time!), but that doesn't alter the metaphysical situation of what truth is supposed to be, which is correspondence.


The 16 ideas from Pascal Engel

In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel]
Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel]
The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel]
We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel]
Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel]
Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel]
The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel]
Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel]
Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel]
Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel]
Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel]
Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel]
Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel]
The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel]
'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel]
We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel]