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Single Idea 4746
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
]
Full Idea
Pragmatism in general is better construed as a certain conception of belief, rather than as a distinctive conception of truth.
Gist of Idea
Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth
Source
Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §1.5)
Book Ref
Engel,Pascal: 'Truth' [Acumen 2002], p.35
A Reaction
Which is why aspiring relativists drift towards the pragmatic theory - because they want to dispense with truth (and hence knowledge), and put mere belief in its place.
The
16 ideas
from 'Truth'
4739
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In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition
[Engel]
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4737
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Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances?
[Engel]
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4738
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The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers
[Engel]
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4744
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We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts
[Engel]
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4745
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Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs
[Engel]
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4746
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Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth
[Engel]
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4750
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The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p'
[Engel]
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4751
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Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic
[Engel]
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4752
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Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p')
[Engel]
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4754
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Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires
[Engel]
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4753
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Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions
[Engel]
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4755
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Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons
[Engel]
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4759
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Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties
[Engel]
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4762
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The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires
[Engel]
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4763
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'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence
[Engel]
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4764
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We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs
[Engel]
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