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Single Idea 4751

[filed under theme 3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth ]

Full Idea

We could compare the status of 'true' with the status of the logical operator 'and' in logic. Once we have explained how it functions to conjoin two propositions, there is not much more to be said about it.

Gist of Idea

Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic

Source

Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.4)

Book Ref

Engel,Pascal: 'Truth' [Acumen 2002], p.50


A Reaction

A good statement of the minimalist view. I don't believe it, because I don't believe that truth is confined to language. An uneasy feeling I can't put into words can turn out to be true. Truth is a relational feature of mental states.


The 7 ideas with the same theme [truth defined formally, without ontology]:

Someone who says 'it is day' proposes it is day, and it is true if it is day [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn]
Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn]
Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich]
Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel]
Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber]
Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG]