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Single Idea 4753
[filed under theme 3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
]
Full Idea
Deflationism about truth seems to deprive us of any hope of asking genuinely metatheoretical questions, which are the questions that occupy philosophers most of the time.
Gist of Idea
Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions
Source
Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.5)
Book Ref
Engel,Pascal: 'Truth' [Acumen 2002], p.54
A Reaction
This seems like the best reason for moving from deflationism to at least minimalism. Clearly one can talk meaningfully about the success of assertions and theories. You can say a sentence is true, but not assert it.
The
16 ideas
from 'Truth'
4739
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In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition
[Engel]
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4737
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Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances?
[Engel]
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4738
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The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers
[Engel]
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4744
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We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts
[Engel]
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4745
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Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs
[Engel]
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4746
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Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth
[Engel]
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4750
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The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p'
[Engel]
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4751
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Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic
[Engel]
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4752
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Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p')
[Engel]
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4754
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Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires
[Engel]
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4753
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Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions
[Engel]
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4755
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Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons
[Engel]
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4759
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Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties
[Engel]
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4762
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The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires
[Engel]
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4763
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'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence
[Engel]
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4764
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We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs
[Engel]
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