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Single Idea 4754

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs ]

Full Idea

Belief is said to 'aim at truth', in the sense that beliefs are the kind of mental states that have to be true for the mind to 'fit' the world (where our desires have the opposite 'direction of fit'; the world is supposed to fit our desires).

Gist of Idea

Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires

Source

Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.5)

Book Ref

Engel,Pascal: 'Truth' [Acumen 2002], p.57

A Reaction

I don't think it is possible to give a plausible definition of belief without mentioning truth. Hume's account of them as thoughts with a funny feeling attached is ridiculous. Thinking is an activity, not a passive state.

The 16 ideas from Pascal Engel

4739 In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel]
4737 Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel]
4738 The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel]
4744 We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel]
4745 Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel]
4746 Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel]
4750 The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel]
4751 Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel]
4752 Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel]
4753 Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel]
4755 Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel]
4754 Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel]
4759 Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel]
4762 The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel]
4763 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel]
4764 We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel]