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Single Idea 4759

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism ]

Full Idea

For functionalism mental states as roles are second-order properties that have to be realised in various ways in first-order physical properties.

Gist of Idea

Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties

Source

Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §3.3)

Book Ref

Engel,Pascal: 'Truth' [Acumen 2002], p.86


A Reaction

I take that to be properties-of-properties, as in 'bright red' or 'poignantly beautiful'. I am inclined to think (with Edelman) that mind is a process, not a property.


The 22 ideas with the same theme [mind is a causal network of functions]:

Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle]
Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle]
Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle]
Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim]
Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim]
Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett]
Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block]
In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block]
You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block]
Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor]
Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge]
If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind? [Rey]
Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research [Rey]
Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan]
If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan]
Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil]
Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel]
Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever]