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Single Idea 4762

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs ]

Full Idea

A problem for the Humean theory of motivation is that it is disputed that beliefs are only representational states, which cannot, unlike desires, move us to act.

Gist of Idea

The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires

Source

Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §4.2)

Book Ref

Engel,Pascal: 'Truth' [Acumen 2002], p.110


A Reaction

This is a crucial issue for Humeans and empiricists. Rationalists claim that people act for reasons, so that reasons are intrinsically motivational (like the Form of the Good), and reasons may even be considered direct causes of actions.


The 28 ideas with the same theme [mental state aiming at truth (Gk. doxa)]:

We can believe a thing without knowing we believe it [Descartes]
Belief is stronger, clearer and steadier than imagination [Hume]
Opinion is subjectively and objectively insufficient; belief is subjective but not objective; knowledge is both [Kant]
Belief matters more than knowledge, and only begins when knowledge ceases [Nietzsche]
The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction [Ross]
Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine]
Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival [Wilson,EO]
We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor]
Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor]
Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson]
Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske]
We must assess the truth of beliefs in identifying them [Newton-Smith]
A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati]
The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis]
Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee]
Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur [Papineau]
We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M]
The function of beliefs is to produce beliefs-that-p when p [Millikan]
Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons]
Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane]
Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane]
We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers]
A notebook counts as memory, if is available to consciousness and guides our actions [Clark/Chalmers]
We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge [Kusch]
The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel]
It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M]
There are reasons 'for which' a belief is held, reasons 'why' it is believed, and reasons 'to' believe it [Neta]
The basing relation of a reason to a belief should both support and explain the belief [Neta]