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Single Idea 4764
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
]
Full Idea
Direct psychological voluntarism about beliefs seems to be false, but we can have an indirect voluntary control on many of our beliefs, by manipulating the states in us that are involuntary and which lead to certain beliefs.
Gist of Idea
We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs
Source
Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §5.2)
Book Ref
Engel,Pascal: 'Truth' [Acumen 2002], p.134
A Reaction
Very nice! This points two ways - to scientific experiments, which can have compelling outcomes (see Fodor), and to brain-washing, and especially auto-brainwashing (only reading articles which support your favourites theories). What magazines do you take?
The
16 ideas
from Pascal Engel
4739
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In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition
[Engel]
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4737
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Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances?
[Engel]
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4738
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The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers
[Engel]
|
4744
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We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts
[Engel]
|
4745
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Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs
[Engel]
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4746
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Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth
[Engel]
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4750
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The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p'
[Engel]
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4751
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Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic
[Engel]
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4752
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Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p')
[Engel]
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4754
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Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires
[Engel]
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4753
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Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions
[Engel]
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4755
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Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons
[Engel]
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4759
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Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties
[Engel]
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4762
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The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires
[Engel]
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4763
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'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence
[Engel]
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4764
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We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs
[Engel]
|