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Full Idea
There is a problem if causation is the object of our analysis, but is also presupposed (as an empirical principle of human psychology) for the functioning of the mind.
Gist of Idea
It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind
Source
Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.7)
Book Ref
Psillos,Stathis: 'Causation and Explanation' [Acumen 2002], p.42
A Reaction
This doesn't sound like a major problem. If it is, it is presumably impossible to analyse the mind, because a mind is presupposed in the process of analysis.
| 2212 | An object made by a saint is the best way to produce thoughts of him [Hume] |
| 2214 | Our awareness of patterns of causation is too important to be left to slow and uncertain reasoning [Hume] |
| 14870 | We experience causation between willing and acting, and thereby explain conjunctions of changes [Nietzsche] |
| 8329 | Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 4769 | It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos] |
| 17527 | Causation seems to be an innate concept (or acquired very early) [Bird] |