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Single Idea 4779
[filed under theme 7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
]
Full Idea
A dominant view, attributed mainly to Kim, is that events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times.
Gist of Idea
For Kim, events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times
Source
report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Events: Mackie on causation [1971]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.6
Book Ref
Psillos,Stathis: 'Causation and Explanation' [Acumen 2002], p.79
A Reaction
The obvious thought is that we might not describe something as an 'event' just because a property was exemplified (seeing red?). And WWII was an event, but a bit more than a 'property exemplification'.
The
108 ideas
from Jaegwon Kim
4781
|
Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday')
[Kim, by Psillos]
|
8396
|
Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation
[Kim, by Tooley]
|
8429
|
Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation
[Kim]
|
8428
|
Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals
[Kim]
|
8430
|
Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories
[Kim]
|
3536
|
Supervenient properties must have matching base properties
[Kim]
|
3535
|
All observable causes are merely epiphenomena
[Kim]
|
10369
|
How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated
[Kim, by Schaffer,J]
|
8974
|
Events are composed of an object with an attribute at a time
[Kim, by Simons]
|
8975
|
Events cannot be merely ordered triples, but must specify the link between the elements
[Kim, by Simons]
|
8976
|
If events are ordered triples of items, such things seem to be sets, and hence abstract
[Simons on Kim]
|
8977
|
Since properties like self-identity and being 2+2=4 are timeless, Kim must restrict his properties
[Simons on Kim]
|
8980
|
Kim's theory results in too many events
[Simons on Kim]
|
4779
|
For Kim, events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times
[Kim, by Psillos]
|
14470
|
Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event
[Kim]
|
13314
|
Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal
[Kim, by Seneca]
|
2308
|
Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies
[Kim]
|
2309
|
Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience
[Kim]
|
2310
|
Supervenience is linked to dependence
[Kim]
|
2311
|
Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction
[Kim]
|
2313
|
Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property
[Kim]
|
2314
|
Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't
[Kim]
|
2315
|
Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts
[Kim]
|
2317
|
Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency
[Kim, by PG]
|
2318
|
Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes
[Kim, by PG]
|
2319
|
Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought
[Kim]
|
2320
|
Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents
[Kim]
|
2322
|
Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time
[Kim]
|
2323
|
Emotions have both intentionality and qualia
[Kim]
|
2324
|
Intentionality as function seems possible
[Kim]
|
2325
|
It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality
[Kim]
|
2327
|
Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful
[Kim]
|
2328
|
The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia
[Kim]
|
2329
|
Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal
[Kim]
|
1550
|
Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"?
[Plato on Kim]
|
2065
|
Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people
[Plato on Kim]
|
530
|
There are two contradictory arguments about everything
[Kim]
|
8825
|
It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data
[Kim]
|
3359
|
Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation
[Kim]
|
3360
|
Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate?
[Kim]
|
3362
|
Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible
[Kim]
|
3363
|
We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing
[Kim]
|
3365
|
Intentionality involves both reference and content
[Kim]
|
3366
|
Pain has no reference or content
[Kim]
|
3367
|
Both thought and language have intentionality
[Kim]
|
3368
|
Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect?
[Kim]
|
3369
|
Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural
[Kim]
|
3370
|
What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs?
[Kim]
|
3371
|
Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together
[Kim]
|
3372
|
Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states
[Kim]
|
3373
|
Snakes have different pain behaviour from us
[Kim]
|
3374
|
Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties
[Kim]
|
3375
|
If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange?
[Kim]
|
3376
|
We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties
[Kim]
|
3377
|
Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation
[Kim]
|
3379
|
Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable
[Kim]
|
3380
|
Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation?
[Kim]
|
3382
|
A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test
[Kim]
|
3383
|
The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements
[Kim]
|
3384
|
The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese
[Kim]
|
3386
|
Folk psychology has been remarkably durable
[Kim]
|
3387
|
A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling
[Kim]
|
3388
|
Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't
[Kim]
|
3389
|
Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional
[Kim]
|
3391
|
Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate
[Kim, by PG]
|
3390
|
Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas?
[Kim]
|
3392
|
Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers
[Kim]
|
3393
|
How do functional states give rise to mental causation?
[Kim]
|
3394
|
Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory
[Kim]
|
3396
|
Experiment requires mental causation
[Kim]
|
3397
|
Beliefs cause other beliefs
[Kim]
|
3399
|
If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness
[Kim]
|
3401
|
A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law
[Kim]
|
3402
|
If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction
[Kim]
|
3403
|
We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs
[Kim]
|
3406
|
Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds
[Kim, by PG]
|
3407
|
Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause
[Kim]
|
3408
|
Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds
[Kim]
|
3409
|
Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete
[Kim]
|
3410
|
Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism
[Kim]
|
3412
|
How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment?
[Kim]
|
3411
|
How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another?
[Kim]
|
3413
|
Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience
[Kim]
|
3414
|
What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible?
[Kim]
|
3416
|
Content may match several things in the environment
[Kim]
|
3417
|
Content depends on other content as well as the facts
[Kim]
|
3418
|
'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful
[Kim]
|
3419
|
Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external
[Kim]
|
3421
|
Content is best thought of as truth conditions
[Kim]
|
3420
|
Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour
[Kim]
|
3422
|
Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence
[Kim]
|
3424
|
Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists
[Kim]
|
3426
|
If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world
[Kim]
|
3427
|
Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical
[Kim]
|
3428
|
Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles
[Kim]
|
3430
|
Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property
[Kim]
|
3431
|
Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty)
[Kim]
|
3432
|
Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property?
[Kim]
|
3434
|
Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things
[Kim]
|
3433
|
The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain
[Kim]
|
3436
|
Should properties be individuated by their causal powers?
[Kim]
|
3437
|
'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan
[Kim]
|
3438
|
Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level
[Kim]
|
3439
|
Reductionism gets stuck with qualia
[Kim]
|
3440
|
Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling
[Kim]
|
13745
|
Supervenience is not a dependence relation, on the lines of causal, mereological or semantic dependence
[Kim]
|
13746
|
Supervenience is just a 'surface' relation of pattern covariation, which still needs deeper explanation
[Kim]
|
15456
|
Extrinsic properties, unlike intrinsics, imply the existence of a separate object
[Kim, by Lewis]
|