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Single Idea 4784
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
]
Full Idea
Salmon argues that processes rather than events should be the basic entities in a theory of physical causation.
Gist of Idea
Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation
Source
report of Wesley Salmon (Causal Connections [1984]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §4.2
Book Ref
Psillos,Stathis: 'Causation and Explanation' [Acumen 2002], p.111
A Reaction
It increasingly strikes me that the concept of a 'process' ought to be ontologically basic. Edelman says the mind is a process. An 'event' is too loose, and a 'fact' too vague, and heaven knows what Hume meant by an 'object'.
The
29 ideas
from Wesley Salmon
4784
|
Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation
[Salmon, by Psillos]
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16557
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Salmon's mechanisms are processes and interactions, involving marks, or conserved quantities
[Salmon, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
|
8411
|
Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation
[Salmon]
|
8412
|
A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards
[Salmon]
|
8413
|
Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous
[Salmon]
|
13047
|
It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that'
[Salmon]
|
13046
|
Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar
[Salmon]
|
13045
|
Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms
[Salmon]
|
13050
|
The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments
[Salmon]
|
13049
|
We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things
[Salmon]
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13051
|
Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain
[Salmon]
|
13053
|
A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference
[Salmon]
|
13054
|
Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations
[Salmon]
|
13055
|
Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence
[Salmon]
|
13056
|
Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability
[Salmon]
|
13057
|
Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies
[Salmon]
|
13058
|
Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation
[Salmon]
|
13059
|
Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts
[Salmon]
|
13061
|
Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering
[Salmon]
|
13060
|
Can events whose probabilities are low be explained?
[Salmon]
|
13062
|
Does an item have a function the first time it occurs?
[Salmon]
|
13063
|
Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts
[Salmon]
|
13064
|
The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic
[Salmon]
|
13067
|
For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations
[Salmon]
|
13065
|
Understanding is an extremely vague concept
[Salmon]
|
8409
|
Probabilistic causal concepts are widely used in everyday life and in science
[Salmon]
|
17093
|
Causation produces productive mechanisms; to understand the world, understand these mechanisms
[Salmon]
|
17492
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Salmon's interaction mechanisms needn't be regular, or involving any systems
[Glennan on Salmon]
|
14366
|
An explanation is a table of statistical information
[Salmon, by Strevens]
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