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Single Idea 4789

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause ]

Full Idea

The three ways to divide theories on causation are: between generalist and singularist, between intrinsic and extrinsic characterisations of the causal relationship, and between reductive and non-reductive approaches.

Gist of Idea

Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive

Source

Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5)

Book Ref

Psillos,Stathis: 'Causation and Explanation' [Acumen 2002], p.127

A Reaction

Okay. I vote for singularist, intrinsic and reductive. I'm guessing that that pushes me towards Salmon and Dowe's theory of the 'transfer of conserved quantities', which is certainly reductive, doesn't need regularities in the events, and seems intrinsic.

The 32 ideas from 'Causation and Explanation'

4799 Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos]
4403 We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos]
4399 Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos]
4400 Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos]
4402 Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos]
4397 Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos]
4395 There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos]
4404 Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos]
4401 It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos]
4767 Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos]
4768 The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos]
4769 It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos]
4770 Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos]
4812 Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos]
4774 Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos]
4780 In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos]
4789 Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos]
4790 If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos]
4792 A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos]
4791 Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos]
4793 "All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos]
4796 Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos]
4801 The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos]
4802 Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos]
4804 The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos]
4803 An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos]
4805 If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos]
4806 An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos]
4807 A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos]
4808 If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos]
4810 Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added [Psillos]
4811 Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos]