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Single Idea 4792
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
]
Full Idea
The Humean view depends on the conjunction of two general theses: first, causation is tied to regularity; secondly, causal facts supervene on non-causal facts.
Clarification
'Supervene' means 'cannot be separated from'
Gist of Idea
A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts
Source
Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5.4)
Book Ref
Psillos,Stathis: 'Causation and Explanation' [Acumen 2002], p.133
A Reaction
If causation is just regularities, this means it is patterns observed by us, which means causation doesn't actually exist. So Hume is wrong. Singular causation is possible, and needs explanation.
The
34 ideas
from Stathis Psillos
4799
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Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties
[Psillos]
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4397
|
Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation
[Psillos]
|
4403
|
We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round
[Psillos]
|
4399
|
Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence
[Psillos]
|
4400
|
Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties
[Psillos]
|
4401
|
It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity
[Psillos]
|
4402
|
Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law
[Psillos]
|
4395
|
There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations
[Psillos]
|
4404
|
Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner
[Psillos]
|
4767
|
Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons
[Psillos]
|
4768
|
The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist
[Psillos]
|
4769
|
It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind
[Psillos]
|
4770
|
Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion
[Psillos]
|
4812
|
Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations
[Psillos]
|
4774
|
Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession
[Psillos]
|
4780
|
In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent
[Psillos]
|
4789
|
Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive
[Psillos]
|
4790
|
If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect
[Psillos]
|
4791
|
Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur
[Psillos]
|
4792
|
A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts
[Psillos]
|
4793
|
"All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law
[Psillos]
|
4796
|
Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities
[Psillos]
|
4801
|
The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it
[Psillos]
|
4802
|
Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law
[Psillos]
|
4804
|
The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events
[Psillos]
|
4803
|
An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event
[Psillos]
|
4805
|
If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole
[Psillos]
|
4806
|
An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink
[Psillos]
|
4807
|
A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it
[Psillos]
|
4808
|
If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction
[Psillos]
|
4811
|
Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises
[Psillos]
|
4810
|
Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added
[Psillos]
|
17996
|
Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure
[Psillos]
|
14933
|
Scientific properties are defined by the laws that embody them
[Psillos, by Ladyman/Ross]
|