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Full Idea
Lewis can elucidate the logic of counterfactuals on the assumption that you are not at all puzzled about what a law of nature is. But if you are puzzled about this, it cannot contribute anything towards resolving your puzzlement.
Gist of Idea
Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter
Source
comment on David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by L. Jonathan Cohen - The Problem of Natural Laws p.219
Book Ref
Psillos,Stathis: 'Causation and Explanation' [Acumen 2002], p.148
A Reaction
This seems like a penetrating remark. The counterfactual theory is wrong, partly because it is epistemological instead of ontological, and partly because it refuses to face the really difficult problem, of what is going on out there.
| 15875 | In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them [Harré] |
| 4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |
| 4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
| 4398 | An event causes another just if the second event would not have happened without the first [Lewis, by Psillos] |
| 3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |
| 4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe] |
| 4788 | Dowe commends the Conserved Quantity theory as it avoids mention of counterfactuals [Dowe, by Psillos] |
| 4780 | In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos] |
| 4791 | Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos] |
| 9489 | Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird] |