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Single Idea 4807

[filed under theme 14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction ]

Full Idea

There can be predictions without explanations, as when a barometer successfully predicts storms, but on its own it does not explain them.

Gist of Idea

A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it

Source

Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.8)

Book Ref

Psillos,Stathis: 'Causation and Explanation' [Acumen 2002], p.236

A Reaction

Actually, barometers contribute to explanations. A reasonable predictor might offer no explanation ('if he's out, she's probably out too'), but an infallible predictor is almost certain to involve causation, which helps a lot in explanation.

The 34 ideas from Stathis Psillos

4799 Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos]
4397 Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos]
4403 We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos]
4399 Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos]
4400 Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos]
4401 It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos]
4402 Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos]
4395 There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos]
4404 Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos]
4767 Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos]
4768 The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos]
4769 It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos]
4770 Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos]
4812 Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos]
4774 Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos]
4780 In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos]
4789 Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos]
4790 If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos]
4791 Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos]
4792 A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos]
4793 "All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos]
4796 Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos]
4801 The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos]
4802 Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos]
4804 The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos]
4803 An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos]
4805 If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos]
4806 An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos]
4807 A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos]
4808 If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos]
4811 Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos]
4810 Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added [Psillos]
17996 Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure [Psillos]
14933 Scientific properties are defined by the laws that embody them [Psillos, by Ladyman/Ross]