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Single Idea 4808
[filed under theme 14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
]
Full Idea
There can be explanations without predictions, as when we explain a previous position of Mars from its present one, plus a law.
Gist of Idea
If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction
Source
Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.9)
Book Ref
Psillos,Stathis: 'Causation and Explanation' [Acumen 2002], p.236
A Reaction
If we don't mind stretching the word, I think we can 'predict' the past, as where I predict the location of an Egyptian tomb from my study of papyruses.
The
34 ideas
from Stathis Psillos
4799
|
Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties
[Psillos]
|
4397
|
Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation
[Psillos]
|
4401
|
It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity
[Psillos]
|
4399
|
Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence
[Psillos]
|
4400
|
Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties
[Psillos]
|
4403
|
We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round
[Psillos]
|
4402
|
Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law
[Psillos]
|
4395
|
There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations
[Psillos]
|
4404
|
Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner
[Psillos]
|
4768
|
The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist
[Psillos]
|
4767
|
Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons
[Psillos]
|
4769
|
It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind
[Psillos]
|
4770
|
Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion
[Psillos]
|
4812
|
Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations
[Psillos]
|
4774
|
Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession
[Psillos]
|
4780
|
In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent
[Psillos]
|
4789
|
Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive
[Psillos]
|
4790
|
If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect
[Psillos]
|
4791
|
Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur
[Psillos]
|
4792
|
A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts
[Psillos]
|
4793
|
"All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law
[Psillos]
|
4796
|
Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities
[Psillos]
|
4801
|
The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it
[Psillos]
|
4802
|
Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law
[Psillos]
|
4804
|
The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events
[Psillos]
|
4803
|
An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event
[Psillos]
|
4805
|
If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole
[Psillos]
|
4806
|
An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink
[Psillos]
|
4807
|
A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it
[Psillos]
|
4808
|
If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction
[Psillos]
|
4811
|
Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises
[Psillos]
|
4810
|
Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added
[Psillos]
|
17996
|
Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure
[Psillos]
|
14933
|
Scientific properties are defined by the laws that embody them
[Psillos, by Ladyman/Ross]
|