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Single Idea 4822
[filed under theme 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
]
Full Idea
All things are conditioned by the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also to exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing that is contingent.
Gist of Idea
Divine nature makes all existence and operations necessary, and nothing is contingent
Source
Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], I Pr 29)
Book Ref
Spinoza,Benedict de: 'Ethics, Improvement of Understanding, Letters', ed/tr. Elwes,R [Dover 1955], p.68
A Reaction
This obviously invites the response of the empiricist: how does he know that? Hume says he can't know it, and Leibniz says he knows it a priori. Traditionally, 'necessary' is the dubious term, but maybe it is 'contingent' which is meaningless.
The
28 ideas
with the same theme
[general views on what gives rise to necessity]:
4822
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Divine nature makes all existence and operations necessary, and nothing is contingent
[Spinoza]
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6181
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Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition
[Kant]
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4192
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All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity
[Schopenhauer]
|
4743
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The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth
[Armstrong]
|
12687
|
Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things
[Ellis]
|
16984
|
I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc.
[Kripke]
|
3867
|
De re necessity arises from the way the world is
[Newton-Smith]
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14629
|
If we are told the source of necessity, this seems to be a regress if the source is not already necessary
[Blackburn]
|
14529
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If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent?
[Blackburn, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
|
12187
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Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world
[McFetridge]
|
13374
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To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations
[Jubien]
|
13391
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Modality concerns relations among platonic properties
[Jubien]
|
11166
|
The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity
[Fine,K]
|
17273
|
Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation
[Fine,K]
|
17289
|
Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something
[Fine,K]
|
14530
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The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics
[Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
|
9216
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Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity
[Fine,K]
|
14531
|
Rather than define counterfactuals using necessity, maybe necessity is a special case of counterfactuals
[Williamson, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
|
19282
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It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts
[Hale]
|
12432
|
Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent
[Hale]
|
12434
|
Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary?
[Hale]
|
12435
|
The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth)
[Hale]
|
15030
|
Humeans say that we decide what is necessary
[Sider]
|
15031
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Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language
[Sider]
|
14101
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Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws?
[Rosen]
|
15103
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Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent
[Cameron]
|
14372
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Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality
[Jacobs]
|
14549
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Maybe truths are necessitated by the facts which are their truthmakers
[Mumford/Anjum]
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