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Single Idea 4862

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation ]

Full Idea

I am in ignorance whether the pineal gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits.

Gist of Idea

Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits?

Source

comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.82) by Baruch de Spinoza - The Ethics V Pref

Book Ref

Spinoza,Benedict de: 'Ethics, Improvement of Understanding, Letters', ed/tr. Elwes,R [Dover 1955], p.246


A Reaction

Is this the earliest statement of the problem of double causation? It is a classic difficulty for dualists, highlighted by Ryle, among others. Avoidance of double causation is a classic reason for moving to monism about mind.


The 12 ideas with the same theme [way in which thought causes events]:

Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes]
Freedom and natural necessity do not contradict, as they relate to different conditions [Kant]
Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle]
Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG]
Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim]
Experiment requires mental causation [Kim]
Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim]
We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau]
Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane]
In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan]
If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil]