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Single Idea 4874

[filed under theme 18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought ]

Full Idea

The ancestor and chief rival of the language-of-thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas - that thoughts are about what they are about because they resemble their objects.

Gist of Idea

The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas

Source

Daniel C. Dennett (Kinds of Minds [1996], Ch.2)

Book Ref

Dennett,Daniel C.: 'Kinds of Minds' [Phoenix 1997], p.68


A Reaction

When you place them side by side, neither seems quite right. How can a mental state resemble an object, and how can an inner language inherently capture the features of an object? Maybe we lack the words for the correct theory.


The 19 ideas with the same theme [brains have an in-built private language ('Mentalese')]:

If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate! [Putnam]
No machine language can express generalisations [Putnam]
Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman]
Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis]
A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett]
The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett]
Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor]
Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor]
Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor]
Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Fodor, by Devlin]
Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor]
We must have expressive power BEFORE we learn language [Fodor]
Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor]
Animals may also use a language of thought [Rey]
We train children in truth, not in grammar [Rey]
Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
Information-processing views of the brain assume the existence of 'information', and dubious brain codes [Edelman/Tononi]
Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence]
The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought [Bayne]