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Single Idea 4889

[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content ]

Full Idea

Although we classify ideas by content for many purposes, we do not individuate them by content. The content of an idea can change.

Gist of Idea

Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change

Source

John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §3.2)

Book Ref

Perry,John: 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness' [MIT 2001], p.51


A Reaction

As the compiler of this database, I find this very appealing. The mind works exactly like a database. I have a 'file' (Perry's word) marked "London", the content of which undergoes continual change. I am a database management system.


The 14 ideas from 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness'

Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry]
If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry]
The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]