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Single Idea 4891
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
]
Full Idea
Epiphenomenalism is usually considered to be a form of dualism, but if we define it as the doctrine that conscious events are effects but not causes, it appears to be consistent with physicalism.
Gist of Idea
If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism
Source
John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §4.2)
Book Ref
Perry,John: 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness' [MIT 2001], p.78
A Reaction
Interesting. The theory was invented to put mind outside physics, and make the closure of physics possible. However, being capable of causing things seems to be a necessary condition for physical objects. An effect in one domain is a cause in another.
The
22 ideas
from John Perry
4885
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Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties
[Perry]
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4884
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Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand
[Perry]
|
4887
|
We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur
[Perry]
|
4888
|
It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them
[Perry]
|
4889
|
Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change
[Perry]
|
4890
|
A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought
[Perry]
|
4891
|
If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism
[Perry]
|
4892
|
If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours
[Perry]
|
4899
|
Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology
[Perry]
|
4898
|
Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities
[Perry]
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4896
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The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension
[Perry]
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4900
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Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent
[Perry]
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4901
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Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world
[Perry]
|
4897
|
A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth
[Perry]
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15203
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Tense is essential for thought and action
[Perry, by Le Poidevin]
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15204
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Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context
[Perry, by Le Poidevin]
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12151
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If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour
[Perry]
|
12149
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Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations
[Perry]
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18412
|
Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction
[Perry]
|
12150
|
Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition
[Perry]
|
16391
|
Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves
[Perry, by Recanati]
|
12155
|
Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance
[Perry]
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