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Single Idea 4891

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism ]

Full Idea

Epiphenomenalism is usually considered to be a form of dualism, but if we define it as the doctrine that conscious events are effects but not causes, it appears to be consistent with physicalism.

Gist of Idea

If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism

Source

John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §4.2)

Book Ref

Perry,John: 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness' [MIT 2001], p.78

A Reaction

Interesting. The theory was invented to put mind outside physics, and make the closure of physics possible. However, being capable of causing things seems to be a necessary condition for physical objects. An effect in one domain is a cause in another.

The 14 ideas from 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness'

4885 Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
4884 Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
4887 We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
4888 It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
4889 Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
4890 A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry]
4891 If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
4892 If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry]
4896 The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
4897 A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
4900 Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
4901 Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
4899 Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
4898 Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]