more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 4892
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
]
Full Idea
The physicalist should not retreat to causal supervenience but should stick with identity. This means we will have to accept that a Martian and I (when in pain) are not in the same phenomenal state.
Clarification
'Martians' are assumed to constructed in a different physical way from ourselves
Gist of Idea
If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours
Source
John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §4.3)
Book Ref
Perry,John: 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness' [MIT 2001], p.88
A Reaction
We naturally presume that frogs feel pain as we do, but many different phenomenal states could lead to the same behavioural end. Only an unpleasant feeling is required. A foul smell would do. Frogs could function with inverted qualia, too.
The
22 ideas
from John Perry
4885
|
Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties
[Perry]
|
4884
|
Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand
[Perry]
|
4887
|
We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur
[Perry]
|
4888
|
It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them
[Perry]
|
4889
|
Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change
[Perry]
|
4890
|
A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought
[Perry]
|
4891
|
If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism
[Perry]
|
4892
|
If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours
[Perry]
|
4901
|
Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world
[Perry]
|
4896
|
The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension
[Perry]
|
4900
|
Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent
[Perry]
|
4899
|
Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology
[Perry]
|
4898
|
Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities
[Perry]
|
4897
|
A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth
[Perry]
|
15203
|
Tense is essential for thought and action
[Perry, by Le Poidevin]
|
15204
|
Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context
[Perry, by Le Poidevin]
|
12149
|
Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations
[Perry]
|
12151
|
If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour
[Perry]
|
18412
|
Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction
[Perry]
|
12150
|
Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition
[Perry]
|
16391
|
Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves
[Perry, by Recanati]
|
12155
|
Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance
[Perry]
|