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Single Idea 4892

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability ]

Full Idea

The physicalist should not retreat to causal supervenience but should stick with identity. This means we will have to accept that a Martian and I (when in pain) are not in the same phenomenal state.

Clarification

'Martians' are assumed to constructed in a different physical way from ourselves

Gist of Idea

If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours

Source

John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §4.3)

Book Ref

Perry,John: 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness' [MIT 2001], p.88

A Reaction

We naturally presume that frogs feel pain as we do, but many different phenomenal states could lead to the same behavioural end. Only an unpleasant feeling is required. A foul smell would do. Frogs could function with inverted qualia, too.

The 22 ideas from John Perry

4885 Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
4884 Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
4887 We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
4888 It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
4889 Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
4890 A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry]
4891 If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
4892 If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry]
4899 Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
4898 Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]
4896 The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
4900 Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
4901 Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
4897 A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
15203 Tense is essential for thought and action [Perry, by Le Poidevin]
15204 Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context [Perry, by Le Poidevin]
12151 If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour [Perry]
12149 Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations [Perry]
18412 Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction [Perry]
12150 Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry]
16391 Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Perry, by Recanati]
12155 Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry]