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Full Idea
The physicalist should not retreat to causal supervenience but should stick with identity. This means we will have to accept that a Martian and I (when in pain) are not in the same phenomenal state.
Clarification
'Martians' are assumed to constructed in a different physical way from ourselves
Gist of Idea
If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours
Source
John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §4.3)
Book Ref
Perry,John: 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness' [MIT 2001], p.88
A Reaction
We naturally presume that frogs feel pain as we do, but many different phenomenal states could lead to the same behavioural end. Only an unpleasant feeling is required. A foul smell would do. Frogs could function with inverted qualia, too.
4885 | Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry] |
4884 | Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry] |
4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
4888 | It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry] |
4889 | Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry] |
4890 | A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry] |
4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
4892 | If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry] |
4896 | The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry] |
4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
4900 | Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry] |
4901 | Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry] |
4899 | Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry] |
4898 | Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry] |