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Single Idea 4895

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia ]

Full Idea

Jackson seems to imply that it isn't fair that all physicalist knowledge can be written down, but not all dualist knowledge can be.

Gist of Idea

Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be

Source

comment on Frank Jackson (What Mary Didn't Know [1986]) by John Perry - Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness §7.5

Book Ref

Perry,John: 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness' [MIT 2001], p.166


A Reaction

This pinpoints a problem for the 'Mary' example - that Mary's new sight of colour is claimed as 'knowledge', and yet the whole point is that it cannot be expressed in propositions (which seems to leave it as 'procedural' or 'acquaintance' knowledge).


The 3 ideas from 'What Mary Didn't Know'

I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry on Jackson]
Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry on Jackson]
Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge [Jackson]