more on this theme     |     more from this text

Single Idea 4899

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds ]

Full Idea

Using possible worlds to model truth-conditions of statements has led to considerable clarity about the logic of modality. Attempts to use the system for epistemic purposes, however, have been plagued by problems.

Clarification

'Modality' is to do with what is possible or necessary. 'Epistemic' issues involve knowing minds.

Gist of Idea

Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology

Source

John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1)

Book Ref

Perry,John: 'Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness' [MIT 2001], p.170

A Reaction

Presumably what lurks behind this is a distinction between what is logically or naturally possible, and what appears to be possible from the perspective of a conscious mind. Is there a possible world in which I can fly?

The 22 ideas from John Perry

4885 Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
4884 Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
4887 We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry]
4888 It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
4889 Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
4890 A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry]
4891 If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
4892 If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry]
4899 Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry]
4898 Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]
4896 The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
4900 Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
4901 Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry]
4897 A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
15203 Tense is essential for thought and action [Perry, by Le Poidevin]
15204 Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context [Perry, by Le Poidevin]
12151 If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour [Perry]
12149 Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations [Perry]
18412 Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction [Perry]
12150 Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry]
16391 Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Perry, by Recanati]
12155 Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry]