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Single Idea 4920

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind ]

Full Idea

The nuts and bolts of thinking - holding ideas in mind and manipulating them - takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex.

Clarification

The 'prefrontal cortex' is at the top of the head, near the front

Gist of Idea

Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex

Source

Rita Carter (Mapping the Mind [1998], p.312)

Book Ref

Carter,Rita: 'Mapping the Mind' [Phoenix 2000], p.312


A Reaction

Keep this firmly in view! Imagine that the skull is transparent, and brain activity moves in waves of colour. Dualism would, in those circumstances, never have even occurred to anyone.


The 22 ideas with the same theme [all mental events can be explained physically]:

You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius]
We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell]
Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle]
Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle]
Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim]
Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau]
Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau]
Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan]
'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H]
We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan]
Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan]
Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette]
Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil]
Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation [Carter,R]
Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex [Carter,R]
We imagine small and large objects scaled to the same size, suggesting a fixed capacity for imagination [Lavers]
Studying biology presumes the laws of chemistry, and it could never contradict them [Friend]