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Single Idea 4927

[filed under theme 18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought ]

Full Idea

So-called information-processing views of the brain have been criticized because they typically assume the existence in the world of previously defined information, and often assume the existence of precise neural codes for which there is no evidence.

Gist of Idea

Information-processing views of the brain assume the existence of 'information', and dubious brain codes

Source

G Edelman / G Tononi (Consciousness: matter becomes imagination [2000], Ch.11)

Book Ref

Edelman,G/Tononi,G: 'Consciousness: how matter becomes imagination' [Penguin 2000], p.126


A Reaction

Fodor is the target here. Searle is keen that 'intrinsic intentionality' is required to see something as 'information'. It is hard to see how anything acquires significance as it flows through a mechanical process.


The 19 ideas with the same theme [brains have an in-built private language ('Mentalese')]:

If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate! [Putnam]
No machine language can express generalisations [Putnam]
Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman]
Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis]
A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett]
The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett]
Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor]
Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor]
Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor]
Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Fodor, by Devlin]
Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor]
We must have expressive power BEFORE we learn language [Fodor]
Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor]
Animals may also use a language of thought [Rey]
We train children in truth, not in grammar [Rey]
Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
Information-processing views of the brain assume the existence of 'information', and dubious brain codes [Edelman/Tononi]
Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence]
The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought [Bayne]