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Single Idea 4954

[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics ]

Full Idea

Frege should be criticised for using the term 'sense' in two senses. For he takes the sense of a designator to be its meaning; and he also takes it to be the way its reference is determined.

Gist of Idea

Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined

Source

comment on Gottlob Frege (On Sense and Reference [1892]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity lectures Lecture 1

Book Ref

Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.59


A Reaction

This criticism doesn't surprise me, as heroic pioneers like Frege seem to have been extremely unclear about what they were claiming. Kripke has helped, but we still need some great mind to step in and sort out the mess.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [giving meaning in the manner laid out by Gottlob Frege]:

'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence]
Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett]
Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege]
Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A]
Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati]
'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A]
Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett]
A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey]
Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A]
Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz]
Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn]
Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati]
Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever]