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Single Idea 4956

[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference ]

Full Idea

In some cases an object may be identified, and the reference of a name fixed, using a description which may turn out to be false of its object.

Gist of Idea

A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object

Source

Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity notes and addenda [1972], note 34)

Book Ref

Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.80

A Reaction

This is clearly possible. Someone could be identified as 'the criminal' when they were actually innocent. Nevertheless, how do you remember which person was baptised 'Aristotle' if you don't hang on to a description, even a false one?

The 14 ideas from 'Naming and Necessity notes and addenda'

17059 Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke]
17058 What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke]
4970 What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke]
9221 The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider]
4950 Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke]
17000 We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke]
16999 A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke]
17003 Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke]
4956 A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke]
17032 Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke]
17044 A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke]
11868 A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke]
17052 The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke]
4969 I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke]