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Single Idea 4959

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential ]

Full Idea

It is in general not the case that the reference of a name is determined by some uniquely identifying marks, some unique properties satisfied by the referent and known or believed to be true of that referent by the speaker.

Gist of Idea

A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent

Source

Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3)

Book Ref

Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.106

A Reaction

He is proposing, instead, his historical/causal theory. There does seem to be a problem with objects which have a historical 'baptism', and then entirely change their properties. Kripke us desperate for a simple account of reference.

The 22 ideas with the same theme [names do no more than pick out an object]:

13789 Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato]
4944 Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Mill, by Kripke]
7762 Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Mill, by Lycan]
4978 The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege]
6410 The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling]
10449 Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach]
15159 The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames]
10823 A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski]
7089 A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object [Wittgenstein]
21879 Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida]
9171 The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
10428 Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
8957 Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó]
4959 A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke]
16982 A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke]
9041 The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
16405 To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
10456 Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
13399 Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien]
7306 If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
21653 Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber]
18945 Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer]